



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 3, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

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COL. WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

STAT

VADM JONATHAN HOWE
Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. WILLIAM B. STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency


SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the SSCI to
Ambassador Kampelman

In a 24 February letter to Ambassador Kampelman which was not delivered until 25 April, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence posed three questions on conventional cruise missiles. The responses take into account interagency and NSC comment. These answers have been transmitted to the Hill.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

Drafted by C/INF: DTJones 
5/02/88 Wang #472

Clearance: C/INF: LReddy

THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Boren:

Attached are responses to your letter of 24 February requesting my views on three questions relating to conventional cruise missiles.

I understand that there was inadvertent delay in the letter's transmittal to the Department which resulted in delivery of the letter to my office only on 25 April. Consequently, we have acted as quickly as possible to obtain interagency agreed responses to expedite final Committee action.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

Attachment:

As stated

The Honorable
David Boren,
Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Senate.

1. Was the decision to include conventionally armed GLCMs in the Treaty based on a unilateral U.S. determination, or does it reflect an expressed Soviet desire to eliminate conventional intermediate range GLCMs? If it reflects a Soviet desire, what did the U.S. achieve in return?

The USG decision to ban conventionally armed GLCMs took into account a number of considerations. It is important to remember what the issue was not about. It was not about whether to permit planned U.S. deployments of conventionally-armed GLCMs; nor was it about whether to withdraw from Europe previously deployed systems. Rather, the decision to be made was whether or not to protect the option for deploying conventionally-armed GLCMs. At the time of the decision, the U.S. and NATO did not -- and do not today -- have any specific plans or military requirements for conventionally-armed GLCMs in the INF range.

Moreover, the USG has fully protected its right to deploy INF range conventional air- and sea- launched cruise missiles. Such systems are not covered by the INF Treaty, and our position in START is that there shall be no limits on conventionally-armed cruise missiles. The INF Treaty also does not cover GLCMs with ranges below 500 kilometers.

Allowing Soviet deployment of conventional GLCMs could have exacerbated the existing conventional imbalance (and added to

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Soviet ability to deliver chemical weapons), especially given the possibility that the Soviets would deploy these systems in far greater numbers than NATO. Any deployment by NATO of additional land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe would, in the current political climate, be a complicated task.

In addition to these reasons, we also had to consider the verification difficulties inherent in distinguishing between nuclear- and conventionally-armed GLCMs. The USG has been unable to develop -- and the Soviet Union has not put forth -- a regime to verify effectively the differences between the two types. Thus, in the context of the INF Treaty, by permitting Soviet conventionally-armed GLCMs, we would have to assume for military planning purposes that the entire force was capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

By banning all GLCMs of INF range, and requiring the elimination of all existing INF GLCM missiles and launchers, we make covert Soviet deployment of INF-range GLCMs more difficult and costly. Moreover, without flight-testing, crew training and exercising of equipment, the operational capability of any covertly stored GLCMs would be seriously degraded over time. Conversely, the Soviet ability to maintain an operational

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nuclear GLCM capability under the guise of a permitted conventionally-armed GLCM program would be high and would provide the Soviets a ready means of breaking out from the Treaty.

Thus, the decision to ban conventionally-armed GLCMs reflected a considered USG judgment based on a number of factors including a military analysis.

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2. What was your understanding, during negotiations, of U.S. requirements for conventional GLCM?

At the time of the decision, the U.S. and NATO did not -- and do not today -- have any specific plans or military requirements for conventionally-armed GLCMs in the INF range.

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3. What was your understanding, during negotiations, of U.S. cruise missile development programs, including programs to improve guidance capabilities?

During the negotiations I was unaware of specific cruise missile development programs but assumed that the U.S. had programs to improve these systems, including their guidance capabilities.

Drafted by C/INF: DTJones
4/28/88 Wang #453

Clearances: S/DEL: MGlitman
C/INF: LReddy
EUR: DSimpson
PM: MMohr
S/ARN: JStarr
S/ART: JReams
ACDA: MAWinston
CIA:
OSD: DStephens
JCS: TKincaid
NSC: JMandel
C: DMcConnell

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February 24, 1988

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
Chief, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear
and Space Arms with the Soviet Union
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Please Refer
To 88-775

Dear Ambassador Kampelman:


The Select Committee on Intelligence has continued its hearings on monitoring and verification issues relating to the INF Treaty. In the course of those hearings, an additional issue has arisen regarding the negotiation of provisions covering cruise missiles. (This issue has also been raised publicly by Richard Perle, among others.) In order to fully understand the reasoning that went into the decision to ban all ground-launched cruise missiles, rather than just nuclear-armed GLCMs, the Committee requests your response to the following questions for the record:

1. Was the decision to include conventionally armed GLCMs in the Treaty based on a unilateral U.S. determination, or does it reflect an expressed Soviet desire to eliminate conventional intermediate range GLCMs? If it reflects a Soviet desire, what did the U.S. achieve in return?
2. What was your understanding, during negotiations, of U.S. requirements for conventional GLCM?
3. What was your understanding, during negotiations, of U.S. cruise missile development programs, including programs to improve guidance capabilities?


The Committee would appreciate receiving your answers to these questions by Wednesday, March 9, so that we can complete our report to the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate as soon

as possible. We would also appreciate receiving each of the answers to the questions in our letter of February 5 as soon as possible, so that we can avoid mistakes in our report.

Sincerely yours,



David L. Boren
Chairman



William S. Cohen
Vice Chairman